Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian by Grabau, Warren E.
Civil War Book Review 
Summer 2008 Article 12 
Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian 
Warren E. Grabau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr 
Recommended Citation 
Grabau, Warren E. (2008) "Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian," Civil War Book 
Review: Vol. 10 : Iss. 3 . 




Bonekemper, Edward H., III Grant and Lee: Victorious American and
Vanquished Virginian. Pr'ger Books, $49.95 hardcover ISBN 9780313349713
Who's the Best General?
A favorite around-the-lunch-table diversion of students of military history is
a game called Who's the best general. One of its major attractions is that none
can unequivocally win or lose, because the criteria for declaring victory are all so
subjective that new challenges can always be made. And so the debates go on
endlessly, as they presumably have since the dawn of civilization. For the most
part it is a harmless but endlessly fascinating entertainment. However, when
regional loyalties (such as Civil War-era North versus South) and their attendant
iconic personalities (such as Robert E. Lee versus Ulysses S. Grant) are invoked,
the discussions can, and often do, become acerbic.
There is a school of thought that has long yearned for objective criteria so
that Who's-the-best disputes could be laid to rest. However, finding such criteria
is a tricky business. It cannot be something as simplistic as simply counting the
numbers of battles won or lost, or for that matter noting the victor if the two
generals meet face to face. Scipio Africanus eventually defeated Hannibal, but
does anyone argue that the Roman was superior to the Carthaginian? Or to move
to more modern times, does the fact that Irwin Rommel lost at El Alamein mean
that Montgomery was the better general?
The difficulty in determining which of two generals was best has always 
been that no one could think of an objective standard of performance. A major 
reason, of course, was that no two generals ever fought the same battle. While 
Lee and McClellan fought in the same battle at Malvern Hill, the two men 
nevertheless actually fought two entirely different battles, so there was no way of 
directly comparing performance. Even if by some magic one could fight the 
battle over again but with the commanders reversed (that is, Lee commanding 
the Army of the Potomac and McClellan leading the Confederate army) the
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problem would not be solved, because such factors as the subtle
interrelationships among a general and his subordinates, upon which so much
depends in battle, would be so different as to defy prediction.
Into this intellectual morass Edward H. Bonekemper has stepped,
brandishing the dread weapon of statistics. While not specifically elucidated,
Bonekemper's thesis seems to be that the number of battle-related casualties
accumulated over the course of a war by the forces under a general's command is
an effective measure of the competence of that general. That is, he who loses the
least is the best. The notion has a certain charm. Certainly the life of a man is a
valuable commodity, and so our sympathies tend to go to the man who spent the
smallest number. Butûis sympathy an objective measure of command
performance?
Assuming for the moment that it is, we must admire Bonekemper's boldness
in invoking Civil War battle casualties in support of his argument, considering
the wildly varied figures provided by the various records and reporters.
Bonekemper faces this difficulty by explaining why the numbers are often so
differentûthe two armies used different protocols for identifying and reporting
casualties; the two armies were not equally reliable in reporting losses; and
various reporters and commentators have, over the years, used different methods
of making estimates û and then explains that he used none of them! Bonekemper
is meticulous about preserving a detailed record of the variability of the original
data. He presents them in two invaluable and exhaustive appendices (Appendix
I, Casualties in Grant's Battles and Campaigns, p. 267, and Appendix 2,
Casualties in Lee's Battle and Campaigns, p. 302). It is doubtful that this
compilation will ever be improved upon. Wisely, Bonekemper did not average
those various reports and estimates (presumably because the rule of statistics is
that all samples must be derived from the same population, and it cannot be
demonstrated that Civil War casualty figures meet that criterion). Instead, he
made his own estimates. Frankly, being personally not unfamiliar with Civil War
casualty numbers, I am neither surprised nor disturbed by Bonekemper's failure
to describe the precise methodology he used to make such estimates. He has
studied û and I suspect meditated over û those records more than any other
person, and I am perfectly happy to accept his estimates as the best that are
humanly possible.
What is perhaps less appealing is that Bonekemper quite obviously had 
reached a conclusion as to the identity of the best general before he began
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analyzing the casualties-records of Lee and Grant. Fortunately, he makes no
bones about this. The very first sentence of the very first paragraph in his book
makes it clear that Grant and Lee is intended as a justification for an already
established opinion. It is well that he does so, because without it, by the time the
reader had reached about page 100, the repetition would have grown tedious.
Bonekemper is a solicitous guide to his conclusions; at every step along the way
he is there to steer us back into the straight and narrow.
As a firm believer in Count Belisarius's dictum that military strategy is no
more than applied geography, I am perhaps hypersensitive to the need for
appropriate maps of the region in which operations were conducted. Maps are by
far the most effective way of conveying the spatial arrangement of essential or
critical points. Thus, to me, a military history book in which the prose cannot be
conveniently tied to a reliable map is an exercise in frustration. One simple
criterion for the adequacy of the maps is this: Do the accompanying maps show
every place named in the text? If not, then the innocent reader is left in an
intellectual vacuum. Unfortunately, attractive and elegant as they are,
Bonekemper's maps do not meet this criterion. To be sure Grant and Lee is not
primarily a book about strategy, operations, and tactics, but Bonekemper
introduces those concepts and uses them as major players in the reasons for the
casualties incurred, and provides maps illustrating them, and that makes them
fair game for analyses.
A single example will suffice. On page 21 is a map entitled Grant's Early
Western Battles and Campaigns, 1861-62," which is presumably intended to
illustrate Chapter 3: Late 1862 / Early 1863: Lee's First Loss and Grant's Early
Victories. Excluding the names of states, which we would expect everyone to
know, only 12 of the 22 geographic names mentioned in that portion of the text
devoted to Grant are actually on the map. There is no map dealing with Lee's
early campaign in western Virginia, so none of the 28 geographic place names in
that portion of the text dealing with Lee's early experiences have a map referent.
Lee was presumably operating in a Never-Never Land for which no maps are
available.
And in a sense, that bias characterizes the book. With but few exceptions,
Lee's experiences are described as consequences of flaws of character or
intellect, while Grant's are associated with positive or desirable traits. To be sure,
as I indicated above, Bonekemper warned us that his objective was to prove that
Grant was the better general. Nevertheless, it was disturbing to read a historical
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analysis that seems so obviously to have been spun in favor of an individual.
Yes, I understand that the Lost Cause writers have been doing that in favor of
Lee (and other Southern generals) for nearly a century. Nevertheless, I suspect
that a spoonful of even-handedness would have made it easier to swallow the
medicine.
I am not sure that Bonekemper intended to write a summary of the Civil
War from the point of view of its two most prominent generals, but he
nevertheless succeeded admirably. If one ignores the partisanship and reads only
for historical content, Grant and Lee is a remarkably concise and coherent
narrative of the war that sweeps aside the irrelevancies and focuses on the
campaigns that decided the war. As such, I commend it to both neophytes and
aficionados. The neophyte will gain a historically accurate appreciation of the
war-as-a-whole, and the buff will see it as a neat summation of a gigantic and
indescribably-bloody chess-game between two nations, both struggling for
existence, and each represented by one remarkable man.
Warren E. Grabau is the author of Ninety-eight Days: A Geographer's View
of the Vicksburg Campaign (University of Tennessee Press, 2000).
4
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol10/iss3/12
